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BY: CHRISTIAN G. OHANIAN
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 2009, twenty-year-old Noor Al-maleki was allegedly run over in a parking lot in Peoria, Arizona by her father, Faleh Almaleki.2 She died soon after in a hospital.3 According to re-
ports, Noor’s father had grown upset that his daughter was “too 
westernized” and that she “failed to live by traditional Muslim 
values and had disrespected the family.”4
This story reflects the controversial issue facing American 
courts as to when a defendant’s culture is relevant in defending 
his or her homicide charge. Some have argued that there should 
be a formal, independent cultural defense equivalent to that 
of an insanity excuse.5 Many 
have claimed that in order to 
ensure all the circumstances 
affecting a particular defen-
dant are considered, a court 
must consider a person’s cul-
ture as an influencing factor 
in their commission of a ho-
micide.6 Here, the focus is pri-
marily on the policy theories 
that support the admissibility 
of evidence of culture through 
the traditional defenses to ho-
micides. The arguments dis-
cussed are those that support 
broad admissibility as well as the relevant critiques of the vari-
ous theories. The questions at the heart of this paper are: 1) who 
is actually capable of introducing this cultural evidence under 
the current conceptual framework; 2) who might be affected 
negatively by a limited category of persons that are capable of 
introducing evidence of culture; 3) what do these issues tell us 
about how we have conceived of this defense?
At the outset of their assessments, scholars who support in-
troducing culture evidence make a blameworthiness determina-
tion as to who can introduce this evidence and who is negatively 
affected by that exclusive category. For various and entirely 
defensible reasons, status as a recent immigrant, for example, 
only a limited group of persons is capable of introducing rel-
evant evidence as to the influence of his/her culture on his/her 
commission of a homicide. We, as a society, have not deter-
mined who can introduce cultural evidence to negate a requisite 
mental state in homicide prosecutions based on values such as 
individualizing justice, equal protection, or multiculturalism. 
Instead, society accepts cultural evidence based on its percep-
tion of the blameworthiness of a newly immigrated defendant 
and his/her un-familiarity with American criminal law, as well 
as, American cultural values in general.
If we do not permit every defendant to introduce evi-
dence of his/her possibly relevant culture in the context of their 
commission of a homicide, then we should admit that we, as 
a society, are making decisions based purely on relativistic 
blameworthiness. We are es-
sentially deciding that there 
are certain cultures that in 
certain contexts can be admit-
ted to “account” for the men-
tal state of a defendant. If, in 
the context of homicide law, 
we, as a society are not fully 
recognizing individualized 
justice, equal protection, and 
multiculturalism as to every 
defendant and his/her culture, 
then society can go further in 
limiting when evidence of a 
defendant’s culture can be in-
troduced to account for his/her mental state. Such a limitation 
prevents defendants from introducing cultural evidence, which 
can demonstrate that defendants’ allegedly culturally motivated 
actions did not have the principle purpose of “maliciously” in-
tending to harm the victim.7 This new standard is later detailed 
in this Article and applied to cases that have dealt with the ad-
mission of evidence of culture.
Part II advances the traditional methods used to introduce 
cultural evidence in defense to homicide prosecutions in most 
American jurisdictions. In Part III of this Article, there is a dis-
cussion of some cases that have involved the introduction of 
cultural evidence. Part IV, introduces and critiques the policy 
theories that support the admissibility of this evidence. Finally, 
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Part V argues the approach to blameworthiness and the admis-
sibility of cultural evidence.
II. DEFENSES USED TO INTRODUCE  
“CULTURAL” EVIDENCE
It should be emphasized at the outset that the issue of cul-
tural evidence and its place in homicide prosecutions that it is 
one of an expansion of the current traditional homicide defenses. 
The defenses discussed below are all available in their tradi-
tional form to every homicide defendant. This section outlines 
some of the methods, both theoretical and practical, defendants 
employ in defense to a homicide charge—by raising issues 
of their culture. One method that has been suggested, though 
never actually implemented in any jurisdiction, is a full formal 
cultural defense.8 Some scholars support recognizing an inde-
pendent cultural defense that would function as a full excuse.9 
These scholars argue that a full defense would be beneficial by 
allowing the justice system to evaluate more homicides that are 
allegedly culturally motivated.10 Effectively, this defense would 
function similarly to that of an insanity defense, as it would fully 
justify the homicide.11 Although scholars frequently discuss a 
full defense in academia, scholars recognize that it has never 
been employed in an American jurisdiction.12 As this concept 
of the full cultural defense has never been used with regard to 
cultural influences in homicide prosecutions, it is not addressed 
it in this Article. It seems to be the least likely of all possible 
solutions to the issue of culture in homicide prosecutions.
Defendants introduce elements of culture at trial through 
the existing defenses and excuses such as: insanity, diminished 
capacity, provocation, and mistake of law or fact.13 Defendants 
in different jurisdictions have attempted to introduce evidence 
of their respective cultures to support these various defenses to 
homicide prosecutions.14 Some jurisdictions have allowed de-
fendants to use evidence of culture to support these defenses.15 
However, other jurisdictions have refused to expand the bound-
aries of what evidence is traditionally admissible with respect to 
these defenses.16 The following section discusses cases involv-
ing the introduction of cultural evidence with the use of various 
defenses to homicide prosecutions.
III. CASES INVOLVING CULTURAL EVIDENCE
The issue of cultural evidence and its admissibility in ho-
micide prosecutions has arisen in many different states across 
the country.17 Many of these homicides involve the murder of 
women and children in response to alleged claims of spousal 
infidelity.18 However, cultural evidence has been a factor in a 
variety of other homicides involving a myriad of alleged moti-
vations.19 In the following section, four homicides are discussed 
that involved cultural evidence – two of which involved spousal 
infidelity and two with different alleged motivations.
In People v. Kimura,20 cultural evidence of was introduced 
to support a “temporary insanity” defense for a woman charged 
with the murder of her two children.21 After discovering that 
her husband was unfaithful she proceeded to attempt oyako-
shinju,22 referred to as a traditional Japanese parent-child sui-
cide ritual.23 She claimed she chose to kill herself so as not to 
live in shame in this world and that to do so without also taking 
her children into the “afterlife” would have been a sign of poor 
motherhood.24 Eventually, her murder charge was reduced to 
voluntary manslaughter through a plea bargain that was pro-
posed following an outcry from the local Japanese community 
and expert testimony regarding her culture and the shame that 
may have induced mental instability.25
In People v. Chen,26 the defendant killed his wife after 
learning of her infidelity.27 Chen “offered cultural evidence to 
show that, as a person from ‘mainland China,’ his wife’s adul-
tery so completely obliterated his sense of control that he was 
provoked to kill his wife.”28 Chen was permitted to introduce 
evidence of culture to support this claim of the relationship 
between his lack of control and his status as a recent Chinese 
immigrant.29 Chen received only a probationary sentence after 
convincing the judge that “traditional Chinese values drove him 
to kill his wife.”30
In State v. France,31 a Korean defendant accidentally killed 
her child by leaving him alone in a motel room dresser drawer.32 
She was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder.33 
The judge ruled that evidence of her culture was inadmissible.34 
However, if admitted it purported to demonstrate that in Korea, 
it is common to leave children alone in the home as neighbors 
and friends are considered unpaid “babysitters.”35 Eventually, 
“France was released on parole following a massive campaign 
organized by Korean women, who pointed out the lack of cul-
turally specific information in her representation.”36
In the case of the death of Binh Gia Pham, five friends 
of this Buddhist youth helped Pham douse himself in gasoline 
and light him on fire in political protest, not aware that such 
actions were crimes in America.37 They also videotaped the 
self-immolation.38 They were all charged with second-degree 
manslaughter,39 carrying a possible sentence of up to ten years 
in prison.40 The practice of Buddhist persons engaging in self-
immolation in political protest is common in other parts of the 
world.41 The judge sentenced the defendants with probation, 
reasoning that Pham would have committed suicide “with or 
without” assistance.42
The Chen and Kimura cases reflect the reality that many 
homicides involving evidence of culture are allegedly provoked 
by acts of spousal infidelity.43 Conversely, France and Pham 
reflect alternate circumstances for the introduction of evidence 
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of culture.44 They appear to be cases involving issues of mistake 
of fact or law regarding the defendants’ actions and their con-
sequences under American law. There are likely to be different 
perceptions of blameworthiness that society attaches to these 
different types of homicides.
The Pham and France cases raise significant questions as 
to how their respective cultures may have affected the principle 
purpose of their actions. In the Pham case, the victim’s friends 
assisted the youth in committing suicide in accordance with his 
cultural traditions.45 Pham thereby engaged in an act of self-
immolation, which is a recognized form of protest in some parts 
of the world.46
In the France case, the defendant left her child in the drawer 
of a motel,47 arguably without the principle purpose to harm the 
child but out of a culturally influenced conception of Korean 
childcare.48 A jury may not believe that such evidence of culture 
in these two cases indicates that the 
principle purpose of the defendants’ 
actions lacked intent to harm. Yet, it 
seems plausible that one could dis-
tinguish these cases with regard to 
the nature of the defendant’s intent 
from a case such as Chen.
In Chen, the defendant’s culture 
was described as tangentially related 
to his rage at discovering his wife’s 
adultery.49 Despite his conviction for 
second-degree murder, his actions 
were principally guided by his intent 
to murder his wife and his culture 
was merely claimed to have exac-
erbated his emotional state.50 The 
Kimura case, presents a more diffi-
cult example. In one sense, she cer-
tainly intended to cause harm to her 
children as she did set out with the 
principle purpose to kill them.51 Yet, 
that purpose to kill was infused with concepts of “taking her 
children into the afterlife” with her,52 which some may see as 
not as blameworthy as the actions of the defendant in the Chen 
case. However, the reality that there may be an issue as to what 
a defendant’s culturally influenced purpose was with regard to 
their intent to harm is what this Article seeks to address.
IV. RATIONALE AND CRITIQUE OF THE  
ADMISSIBILITY OF CULTURAL EVIDENCE
As with all aspects of American homicide law, policy-
based theories support and justify the admissibility of evidence 
of culture. The three prominent theories often recognized by 
scholars are individualized justice, equal protection, and multi-
culturalism. With regard to the theory of individualized justice 
supporting the introduction of evidence of culture, a seldom 
considered, yet important, critique of this policy theory limits 
what cultures can be said to “account” for the mental state of a 
homicide defendant. Although culture is attached to the concept 
of the push to admit this evidence, in reality, there are certain 
circumstances where certain cultures are considered less blame-
worthy than others.
A. INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE
The necessity of individualizing justice as it pertains to 
criminal defendants permeates American criminal jurispru-
dence. At the heart of this concept, is the idea that the circum-
stances, characteristics, history, culture, and a myriad of other 
subjective elements that affect the mind and behavior of a de-
fendant must be considered in order 
to ensure a just determination of that 
defendant’s culpability.53 According 
to Professor Martin Gardner, “[i]
n the context of the criminal law, 
the ultimate aim of this principle 
of individualized justice is to tailor 
punishment to fit the degree of the 
defendant’s personal culpability.”54 
This is a retributive theory; it argues 
that it would be unjust to prohibit 
the introduction of non-customary 
evidence in criminal prosecutions.55 
This theory of individualized justice 
often finds its strongest supporters in 
the realm of homicide prosecutions.56
The “Battered Spouse Defense” 
is one of the more recent manifesta-
tions of this push to “individualize 
justice” to a particular defendant’s 
circumstances.57 Professor Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman states, “[t]his movement [toward individu-
alized justice] to inject subjectivity into the guilt phase of pro-
ceedings has been somewhat successful in cases where battered 
women are tried for killing their abusers.”58 Effectively, this 
defense has led some jurisdictions to relax the typical require-
ments with respect to provocation and self-defense.59
Although not as broadly successful, a similar push has 
occurred to permit the introduction of evidence of culture to 
support homicide defenses such as provocation, insanity, and 
mistake of law or fact.60 Some scholars have suggested evi-
dentiary approaches to cultural evidence that the “purpose of 
the cultural practice” and “moral culpability” along with sev-
eral other factors in determining the admissibility of such evi-
dence.61 However, because these approaches are not grounded 
Although culture is 
attached to the concept 
of the push to admit this 
evidence, in reality, there 
are certain circumstances 
where certain cultures 
are considered less 
blameworthy than others.
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in the premise that the underlying motivation for the admission 
of this evidence is “blameworthiness,” they do not suggest that 
“intent to harm” or “malice” should be the only considerations 
evaluated in deciding whether to admit “cultural” evidence.62 
Professor Alison Dundes Renteln stated, “[i]f the legal system 
is to understand what motivates the actions of another, it must 
understand that person’s culture.”63 Many scholars justify a re-
quest for leniency based upon the idea that the newly immi-
grated person is unfamiliar with American criminal law.64 An 
article in the Harvard Law Review asserts,
Although ignorance of the law is generally no excuse 
in a criminal prosecution fairness to the individual 
defendant suggests that ignorance of the law ought to 
be a defense for persons who were raised in a foreign 
culture. Treating persons raised in a foreign culture 
differently should not be viewed as an exercise in fa-
voritism, but rather as a vindication of the principles 
of fairness and equality that underlie a system of indi-
vidualized justice.65
In addition to issues of mistake of law as to newly immi-
grated persons, group based standards have also been consid-
ered as a method to address the issue of individualizing justice 
for a defendant seeking to introduce evidence of culture.66 Con-
cepts such as the “reasonable Italian man” or the “reasonable 
Mexican man” as standards have been largely unsuccessful 
when presented at trial.67 However, the attempt to establish such 
group-based standards is an important permutation of attempts 
to individualize justice for defendants who wish to incorporate 
their respective cultures into their defenses to homicide pros-
ecutions. Although this move to individualize justice has its 
advocates, it has also faced a significant amount of critique.68
There are many critiques that face the individualized justice 
theory for supporting the admissibility of evidence of culture. 
However, two seldom, and never thoroughly considered cri-
tiques are important: 1) What qualifies as a supposed “account-
able culture” and 2) What elements of a supposed “accountable 
culture” would need to manifest in order to be considered under 
this theory? These considerations cut at the heart of this concern 
for individualizing justice to a particular defendant.
An “accountable culture” for the purposes of this Article 
is a culture that has a significant enough influence on the de-
fendant’s mental state, decisions, and actions that resulted in 
a crime (more specifically here, a homicide) that courts have 
found, or are likely to find, that the culture accounts in a signifi-
cant way for the defendant’s commission of a homicide. Some 
might shy away from labeling a defendant’s culture as poten-
tially accountable in some way for the commission of a crime 
for the unfortunate connotations of such a label. However, as 
this Article, merely attempts to accurately illustrate the real-
ity of this complex issue. By allowing evidence of a person’s 
culture to account for his/her mental state in the commission 
of a homicide, courts in this country are permitting some de-
fendants’ cultures to account in some significant way for his/
her commission of a homicide, while other defendants’ cultures 
cannot.
Some scholars have touched on the difficulty in defining 
what would constitute an accountable culture under the cur-
rent conception of a cultural defense or admissible evidence of 
culture. Daina C. Chiu stated, “[t]he defense also essentializes 
culture by defining it as the exclusive province of particular 
groups. Under affirmative defense proponents’ conception of 
culture, some groups have culture, others do not.”69 This in-
herent exclusiveness as to whom can possess an accountable 
culture in the context of homicide prosecutions creates a serious 
flaw in the move to individualize justice. Chiu goes on to indi-
cate the difficulty in defining culture as part of the problem, “[d]
efining the parameters of a group who could raise the defense 
would require crafting a rule that would take into account the 
innumerable permutations of race, ethnicity, language, educa-
tion, religion, culture, gender, length of residence in the United 
States, and age.”70 However, although a legal definition of cul-
tures that could be held accountable under the law would be 
difficult to determine, anthropologists have attempted to syn-
thesize a definition of culture:
Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feel-
ing and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of 
human groups, including their embodiments in arti-
facts; the essential core of culture consists of tradi-
tional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values.71
This definition indicates that “patterned ways of thinking, 
feeling and reacting” could apply to people raised in many dif-
ferent communities, both newly immigrated and otherwise.72 
However, although the common conception of culture is some-
thing that can affect the behavior of essentially anyone raised in 
a certain community, the concept of culture that most theorists 
consider when discussing cultural defenses and cultural evi-
dence is limited to those cultures of newly immigrated persons. 
Professor Volpp stated, “the concept of a ‘cultural defense’ rests 
on the idea of a community not fully ‘integrated’ into the United 
States and assists . . . ‘immigrants.’”73 Another author noted 
that culture encompasses a “vast” array of factors,74 but still 
proceeded to limit the concept of a cultural defense as one per-
taining to “immigrants, refugees, and indigenous people based 
on their customs or customary law.”75 Although it is understand-
able to limit the concept of a cultural defense to those who are 
newly immigrated and thus unaccustomed to the criminal law 
of this country, limiting supposed accountable cultures to that of 
newly immigrated persons chips away at the argument that evi-
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dence of culture must be introduced in homicide prosecutions 
in order to individualize justice. Individuals raised in American 
communities with strict cultures who were equally affected by 
culture would be prevented from introducing this evidence of 
culture if they were not newly immigrated to this country.
In addition to the issues that surround a limited category 
of supposed accountable cultures, even with such a category 
we would still be faced with determining what elements of that 
person’s culture would have a significant enough affect on their 
behavior to warrant admissibility as evidence. As one author 
states,
The cultural defense seeks to encompass a vast range 
of factors that include social mores, beliefs, practices, 
and values about gender, family, government, and re-
ligion, to name only a few. The challenge of creating 
and mounting a cultural defense is to select from many 
cultural factors those that are relevant and applicable.76
Although this author is referring to the concept of a full affirma-
tive cultural defense,77 this issue—what elements of a person’s 
culture would be relevant and admissible for exculpatory pur-
poses in a homicide proceeding—also applies to evidence of 
culture. Professor Kim describes the practical issue of expert 
testimony and how it has the potential to paint a skewed image 
of one’s culture:
Given the difficult in defining culture, the likelihood 
increases that expert testimony will, out of necessity, 
provide a broad, simplistic characterization of the de-
fendant’s culture rather than accurate, contemporary 
depiction of the norms and mores that reflect the social 
progress occurring in the defendant’s home country.78
The issues of determining what cultures would be considered ac-
countable and the related issue of what elements of such an ac-
countable culture would be relevant, to demonstrate the inherent 
difficulties with individualizing justice as to culture. According 
to most theorists, certain persons, whose behavior would likely 
be affected or dictated by their respective cultures, would be 
incapable of using such evidence if they were not newly im-
migrated.79 Furthermore, even if they were newly immigrated 
and could admit evidence under this theory, there would still be 
discretionary choices as to what elements of their culture were 
responsible for their actions.80 If we are truly concerned about 
individualizing justice based on a person’s culture, then we need 
to expand this concept to include all cultures that could influ-
ence a defendant’s behavior. However, since we do not take 
such a broad approach to supposed accountable cultures, the 
current limitations on admissible evidence significantly under-
mines the argument that we are individualizing justice for each 
defendant.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
Another policy concern is whether immigrants are receiv-
ing equal protection of the law when they cannot introduce 
evidence of culture in homicide prosecutions.81 The argument 
focuses on a newly immigrated person being deprived of the 
ability to fully litigate one of the established defenses such as: 
insanity, self-defense, or provocation. By being prevented from 
introducing all the evidence that would be relevant to their de-
fenses, defendants are not able to fully litigate these defenses. 
This causes newly immigrated persons to receive unequal treat-
ment in comparison with other homicide defendants.
Many scholars discuss the issue of not being able to equally 
litigate a defense to a homicide prosecution as it pertains to 
the example of provocation. Professor James J. Sing stated, “[i]
f, however, the provocation defense is in essence a dominant-
cultural defense, then denying foreign defendants the right to 
introduce cultural evidence effectively denies them use of the 
provocation doctrine.”82 Professor Sing employs an example to 
demonstrate this inequality: in cases where the prosecution must 
prove malice, and the defendant is prevented from introducing 
evidence of culture as provocation, the prosecution does not 
have the same burden of proof as it would face with a non-
cultural defendant.83 Although, this is a valid concern regarding 
which evidence can be introduced in support of one’s defense 
to a homicide prosecution, some scholars have suggested it may 
not be accurate to call this restriction a deprivation of equal pro-
tection of the law.84 Some scholars have argued that these ho-
micide defendants are being restricted from admitting evidence 
of culture to support a homicide defense in the same manner as 
every other homicide defendant.85 This critique is particularly 
convincing in light of the reality that very few defendants, those 
who could legitimately claim some kind of cultural influence 
with regard to their commission of a homicide, would be per-
mitted to admit evidence of their culture.
 Other scholars have argued that an alternate equal protec-
tion concern should take precedence: the equal protection of the 
victims of allegedly “culturally motivated homicides.”86 Profes-
sor Coleman stated, “permitting the use of culture-conscious, 
discriminatory evidence as part of the defendant’s case-in-chief 
distorts the substantive criminal law and affords little or no pro-
tection to victims, whose assailants are left, as a result of this 
distortion, relatively free from broader societal strictures.”87 
Many of these homicides are in response to alleged or actual 
issues of spousal infidelity. With the prevalence of homicide 
victims who are women and children, some are concerned that 
by allowing certain defendants to use supposed accountable 
cultures in their defense, the system will allow particular defen-
dants to be exculpated where others would not, leaving these 
victims with no legal recourse.88
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Although the equal protection concern for defendants with 
regard to evidence of culture is legitimate, the arguments re-
garding the equal protection of the victims of these homicides 
would seem to be just as pressing.
C. MULTICULTURALISM
Multiculturalism, or “cultural pluralism,” is often used to 
support the admissibility of evidence of culture in homicide 
prosecutions. The theory of multiculturalism rests on the philo-
sophical concept that objective truth in the law only exists as 
reflected in the voices of those who draft the law.89 Furthermore, 
this theory advocates that in order to build a truly just society 
the law should reflect diverse voices, cultures and perceptions 
in order to avoid ethnocentrism and to promote a deep respect 
for all cultures.90
Some, if not all, of these scholars also advocate the 
view that legal discourse and practice should be 
changed to more accurately reflect the diverse voices 
of all members of society. Indeed, it is argued that 
without such a transformation, the fairness and justice 
promised by a modern, liberal interpretation of our na-
tion’s founding documents cannot be achieved.91
In addition, many proponents of multiculturalism in the 
American legal system see the concept of assimilation as dis-
criminatory.92 For example, Professor Sing believes, “the mul-
ticulturalism movement, whose proponents argue that the old 
‘melting pot’ social metaphor, which privileges the erosion of 
cultural distinctness in the dominant cultural stew, is obsolete 
and at times discriminatory.”93 Although the diverse voices of 
American society should be reflected in the drafting of our law, 
it might be unreasonable to expect that such a value should be 
capable of pushing the limits of homicide defenses. Some au-
thors have gone as far as to say that evidence of culture should 
be admissible in all prosecutions except for homicides because 
of the severity of the crime.94 Again, although there is certainly 
a value in reflecting multiculturalism in the law, it may not be 
prudent to allow such a value to push the traditional bound-
aries of defenses to homicides. The policies of individualized 
justice and equal protection are stronger than multiculturalism 
in supporting the broad introduction of evidence of culture in 
homicide prosecutions.
The aforementioned theories—individualized justice, equal 
protection, and multiculturalism—are formidable policy justi-
fications for the expansion of the traditional defenses to ho-
micides in favor of evidence of culture. However, this Article 
attempted to demonstrate that each of these policy justifications 
have certain limitations based on their assumption that soci-
ety perceives the newly immigrated defendant, rather than the 
cultural defendant as less blameworthy when he/she commits 
a homicide related to the alleged influence of his/her culture. 
The justifications for expanding limits to traditional defenses 
to allow for cultural evidence are inherently based on that pre-
liminary blameworthiness determination, limiting who can avail 
themselves of this evidence. We, as a society, can take two ap-
proaches: 1) allow all persons, influenced by any definable, rec-
ognizable culture to admit relevant evidence in their homicide 
defense; or 2) limit the introduction of evidence of culture to 
defendants who are likely to be considered by society to be the 
least harmful or blameworthy. As it is virtually impossible that 
any jurisdiction would recognize a broad concept of culture ex-
tending to anyone who could claim a definable culture, I will 
focus on the second option.
In the next section, it is argued that although blameworthi-
ness is a valid concern, if it is to be the basis for justifying the 
admissibility of evidence of culture, then as a society we are 
free to limit admissibility to those homicide defendants that we 
perceive as the least blameworthy.
V. A NEW APPROACH TO CULTURAL EVIDENCE  
AND BLAMEWORTHY HOMICIDES
Some scholars that discuss the admission of evidence of 
culture believe that precisely because a homicide is a human 
rights violation, evidence of culture should be permitted in 
We, as a society, can take two approaches: 1) allow all persons, 
influenced by any definable, recognizable culture to admit relevant 
evidence in their homicide defense; or 2) limit the introduction of 
evidence of culture to defendants who are likely to be considered by 
society to be the least harmful or blameworthy. 
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nearly every other criminal prosecution except homicide.95 The 
aforementioned policy theories: individualized justice, equal 
protection, and multiculturalism are valid theories concerned 
with retributive and culpability issues surrounding homicide de-
fendants. Although these concerns, and in particular the concern 
for individualizing justice are valid, the previously discussed 
limitations indicate that these theories are making blameworthi-
ness determinations pertaining to a limited category of defen-
dants at the outset.
The limited nature of these theories, as pertaining exclu-
sively to the cultures of newly immigrated peoples, indicates 
that these theories have made a blameworthiness determina-
tion based more on the recent immigration of the defendant, 
rather than the cultural influence in question. There is certainly 
validity in finding a newly immigrated defendant, unfamiliar 
with American criminal law, to be less blameworthy for what 
is allegedly culturally motivated action. However, we, as a so-
ciety, could take a slightly different approach to this issue of 
culpability.
In their debate over expanding the traditional limitations of 
the insanity, provocation, and mistake of law or fact defenses 
with regard to evidence of culture, scholars fail to address the 
issue of whether the actor’s principle purpose was to cause 
harm through his or her allegedly culturally motivated action. 
Legitimate concerns regarding individualized justice, equal 
protection, and multiculturalism should open the door to some 
evidence of culture in some homicide prosecutions. However, 
due to the previously discussed limitations, traditional defenses 
should be expanded to admit this evidence only as far as what 
society would consider the least blameworthy.
I would also limit my proposed approach regarding admis-
sibility of cultural evidence to newly immigrated defendants or 
those who have lived in extremely insular immigrant communi-
ties. This is a necessity, considering the unlikelihood of broader 
acceptance for the admissibility of cultural evidence for other 
defendants. However, the focus of this approach will not deter-
mine exactly how long an immigrant defendant would have to 
be in this country or how insular his/her community must be. 
Instead, my new approach is focused on creating a functional 
framework for the actual admission of the evidence.
Society could agree that homicides which were caused by 
allegedly culturally motivated actions whose principal purpose 
was not intended to cause harm to the victims may constitute 
a less blameworthy category of homicides. In such contexts, 
judges should be permitted to admit cultural evidence. Fur-
thermore, when this primary or principle purpose of intend-
ing harm functions as the central issue a judge would consider 
when determining whether to admit cultural evidence is based 
on a conception of intending harm closely paralleling “malice.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines malice as: “1. The intent, with-
out justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. 2. Reck-
less disregard of the law or of a person’s legal rights. 3. Ill will; 
wickedness of heart.”96 This concept of malice, when a person 
intends harm with “ill will” or a “wickedness of heart” certainly 
could lead to issues of imprecision.
However, this is a workable concept of “intent to harm” 
for my framework of introducing cultural evidence. If a person 
commits a culturally motivated homicide, with intent to cause 
harm that reflects malice, rather than some other culturally in-
fluenced purpose, then they will not be permitted to introduce 
evidence of culture. To illustrate how my new approach to the 
blameworthiness of allegedly culturally motivated homicides 
would operate in actual scenarios, a new approach will be ap-
plied to the four cases described earlier: Chen, France, Pham, 
and Kimura.
In Chen, the defendant “offered cultural evidence to show 
that, as a person from ‘mainland China,’ his wife’s adultery so 
completely obliterated his sense of control that he was provoked 
to kill his wife.”97 Using expert testimony, Chen was permit-
ted to introduce evidence as to the nature of his culture that 
provoked him to kill his wife.98 Under my proposed approach 
Chen would be prohibited from introducing the aforementioned 
evidence as to his provocation. Even under the “influence of 
his culture,” it is clear that Chen could not have perceived of 
his actions as not maliciously intending to cause harm to his 
wife. Therefore, under my approach to blameworthiness and 
the admissibility of evidence of culture, Chen would only be 
capable to admitting evidence traditionally permitted under the 
provocation defense to homicide. He would not be allowed to 
introduce cultural evidence.
Conversely, in the France case, where the defendant left her 
child in a dresser drawer of a hotel room,99 the defendant would 
be permitted to introduce evidence of culture. The relevant evi-
dence of Korean culture seemed to indicate that neighbors often 
served as unpaid “babysitters,” and the defendant claimed that 
she did not intend to cause any harm to her child.100 As there is 
an issue here of the defendant having a legitimate claim to not 
maliciously intending to cause any harm, she would be permit-
ted to introduce evidence of culture to support her defense.
Similarly, in the case of the friends of Binh Gia Pham, 
this culture evidence would also be admissible. Pham’s friends 
helped perform his political protest by assisting in his self-
immolation, and were later charged with second-degree man-
slaughter, facing up to ten years in prison.101 These youths had 
no intention to harm their friend; they merely assisted him in his 
decision to end his life in what is an accepted form of political 
protest in some parts of the world.102 They would be permitted 
to admit evidence of culture under my approach to support their 
respective mistake of law of fact defense.
My proposed approach may function as an acceptable, 
workable solution to manage the competing interests of the 
aforementioned culpability theories that advocate for wide-
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spread introduction of cultural evidence and for those who 
believe it should not be admitted to expand the homicide de-
fenses at all. However, like many blameworthiness approaches 
in the criminal law, I recognize that it does have the potential 
for rather controversial results. Take for example, the poten-
tial results in the aforementioned Kimura case, which involved 
a woman who drowned her children and attempted to drown 
herself in response to her husband’s infidelity.103 The theory 
that the defense attempted to use was that she was driven in-
sane due to her culture’s emphasis on how she was “living in 
shame.”104 In addition, cultural evidence demonstrated that fail-
ing to “take” her children into the “afterlife” with Kimura would 
have been a sign of “bad motherhood.”105 It could be argued 
that Kimura should be entitled to introduce evidence of culture 
due to the fact that in a metaphysical sense she could argue that 
she was not maliciously attempting to “harm” her children by 
taking them into the “afterlife.” Under my approach, there is 
potential for cases such as this where determining “malice” and 
“intent to harm” is difficult. However, a judge, functioning as 
the gatekeeper of this evidence, and the jury with the power to 
the credibility of such evidence, may be enough to manage the 
difficulties.
Although the Kimura case illustrates how my approach 
could create difficult determinations as to when to admit evi-
dence of culture, there may be a workable solution. If we can 
admit that the concept of expanding the established homicide 
defenses to include evidence of culture is based on our society’s 
perception of blameworthiness, then we are free to limit admis-
sibility to defendants that society would likely consider the least 
blameworthy. Limiting admissibility based on whether, while 
influenced by his/her culture, the defendant’s actions reflected a 
malicious purpose to harm the victim, may be a workable solu-
tion to the issue of the admissibility of cultural evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The presence of many diverse cultures enriches each mem-
ber of this society by expanding their perception of the world. 
However, there are unfortunate moments when a person’s cul-
ture can be associated either willingly or unwillingly with the 
commission of a homicide. The admissibility of evidence of cul-
ture to support defenses to homicides will not cease to be a diffi-
cult and controversial issue facing American courts throughout 
the United States. Culture itself is a term that is difficult to 
define, and in many cases, could apply to a wide spectrum of 
persons whether or not they are newly immigrated to this coun-
try. Proponents of the expansion of the traditional defenses to 
homicides to include evidence of culture do not generally sug-
gest that this concept should apply to persons who are not newly 
immigrated to this country.106 Although there is certainly a jus-
tification for limiting this concept of cultural evidence to those 
who are unfamiliar or unaccustomed to American criminal law 
due to their minimal exposure to it in this country, that limita-
tion does reflect a blameworthiness determination at the outset.
We, as a society, are unlikely to expand the concept of cul-
ture as it is considered with regard to cultural evidence, to apply 
to all persons who may have a legitimate and influential culture 
as a presence in their lives. Thus, if we can admit that we are 
creating that limitation as a society at the outset of considering 
cultural evidence for certain defendants, and not for others, then 
we are free to place further limitations on when this evidence 
can be considered. If we, as a society, consider certain actors to 
be less blameworthy when they, while allegedly influenced by 
their cultures, commit what the law may deem to be a homicide 
without the primary purpose to maliciously cause harm to the 
victim, then we should adopt an approach to match that reality. 
There are drawbacks to my approach; one would be the occa-
sional case where malice and intent to harm will be difficult to 
determine. Nevertheless, if society can admit, for example, that 
it is likely to perceive homicides that are motivated solely by 
spousal infidelity as more blameworthy than other homicides, 
such as the Buddhist self-immolation protest case, then we 
should be able to craft a rule to reflect that reality.
If we do not wish to expand the traditional homicide de-
fenses through a blameworthiness determination of the influ-
ence of a person’s culture, then we should cease the practice all 
together. If we are to make certain blameworthiness determina-
tions, then we should admit that we are pursuing that course and 
employ a method that individualizes justice to a particular de-
fendant while not undermining whatever concept of blamewor-
thiness this society perceives with regard to certain homicides.
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